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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Brown'
(decided November 19, 2009)
Michael Brown was convicted in the Queens County Supreme
Court of two counts of first-degree sodomy,2 two counts of second-
degree assault,' and endangering the welfare of a child.4 On appeal,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction.
Defendant Brown appealed to the New York Court of Appeals,
claiming that the introduction of a DNA report without testimony
from the analyst who initiated the test violated his right to confronta-
tion as guaranteed by the United States Constitution 6 and the New
York Constitution.7 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the forensic biologist alone, who conducted the DNA analy-
' 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.50 (McKinney 2009) states, in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the first degree when he or
she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another
person: (1) By forcible compulsion; or (2) Who is incapable of consent
by reason of being physically helpless; or (3) Who is less than eleven
years old; or (4) Who is less than thirteen years old and the actor is eigh-
teen years old or more.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05 (McKinney 2009) states, in pertinent part: "A person is guilty
of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person."
4 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2008) states, in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when (1) He
knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental
or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old or directs or au-
thorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial
risk of danger to his life or health.
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930.
5 People v. Brown, 856 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2008).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness against him."
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 states, in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the
party accused shall be allowed to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.";
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930.
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sis, was sufficient to satisfy the defendant's right to confront.'
On August 6, 1993, defendant Michael J. Brown followed a
nine-year-old female into an apartment building in Queens, New
York.9 With her mouth covered, the nine-year-old was led to the roof
of the building, where Brown began threatening her.'0 In an attempt
to sexually assault the adolescent, Brown burned a hair clip into the
victim's arm and then struck her alongside the head due to her resis-
tance to his advances." Consequently, the nine-year-old was
knocked unconscious and later woke up naked, except for a t-shirt
covered in blood.'2 She also appeared to have been kicked in the
face.
After running to her friend's apartment, the victim was trans-
ported to a local hospital, where she was interviewed by the police.14
She was unable to give a detailed description of her attacker, except
that "he was an African-American male in his mid-thirties."s A rape
kit was prepared by the hospital, which was subsequently delivered to
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner ("OCME").16 However,
the OCME was suffering from a substantial backlog and thus could
not immediately process the rape kit. '
On August 2, 2002, approximately nine years following the
attack, the victim's rape kit was sent to Bode Technology ("Bode"), a
subcontracting laboratory of the OCME, for testing.'8  Six months
later, the DNA found in the victim's rape kit was matched with the
characteristics of Brown's DNA.' 9 After the link was made between
the defendant and the victim's attacker, an OCME forensic biologist









17 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 928.
" Id. at 928-29. OCME was able to send the victim's rape kit, as well as hundreds of oth-
ers, to its subcontractors after it received additional financial support to remedy the backlog.
Id.
19 Id. at 929. "[The] defendant's DNA specimen had been recorded in . . . [a] national da-
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conducted a more precise examination of the two DNA specimens.20
The OCME forensic biologist confirmed the initial finding, conclud-
ing that "the profiles [of defendant Brown and the rape kit specimen]
were a match occurring in one out of one trillion males."21
Brown was charged with two counts of sodomy in the first
degree, kidnapping in the second degree, three counts of assault in
the second degree, and endangering the welfare of a child.2 2 At trial,
the prosecution called the OCME forensic biologist as a witness, who
testified about her analysis of defendant Brown's DNA. 23 The wit-
ness also described her position at OCME, the process by which she
analyzed the defendant's DNA, the procedures and standards imple-
mented by both OCME and Bode, and her extensive background in
performing this type of test.24
The prosecution tried to introduce into evidence a DNA report
generated by Bode, claiming that it was admissible as a business
record.25 The defense counsel objected to its admissibility on
grounds that it would violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation, given that "any documents generated by Bode were
'testimonial evidence.' "26 Furthermore, the OCME forensic biolo-
gist was "not familiar with Bode's quality assurance and how this
particular test was performed." 2 7
In response, the prosecution claimed that the report contained
"merely raw data and was not testimonial, and that the witness herself
had performed the analysis in comparing the defendant's profile with
the profile of the DNA found in the rape kit."28 After the OCME fo-
rensic biologist testified in support of the prosecution's contention
that the report did not contain any of Bode's conclusions, and only
"her own scientific conclusions from analyzing the data and defen-





25 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 929.
26 id.
27 id
28 Id. at 929-30. The prosecution relied on People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y.
1995) and People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501 (N.Y. 1986), which indicated that "a business
record can be introduced by a person who is not a custodian of records, provided that the
other criteria for the business record exception are established." Id. at 930.
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dant's DNA profile," the report was admitted into evidence.29
Defendant Brown was later convicted of two counts of first-
degree sodomy, two counts of second-degree assault, and endanger-
ing the welfare of a child.3 0 The conviction was affirmed by the ap-
pellate division.3 ' On appeal, Brown claimed that (1) his "Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the introduction of
a DNA report processed by a subcontractor laboratory to the
[OCME]," (2) "the results of the Bode procedures could have been
tainted by a pro-law-enforcement bias to inculpate [the] defendant,"
(3) "the OCME witness's testimony [did not] provide a sufficient
foundation for introducing the Bode documents under ... [the] busi-
ness records rule," and (4) "his right to effective assistance of counsel
was violated when his attorney did not raise the statute of limitations
claim again, after the victim provided a more ample description of
her attacker during her trial testimony." 32 The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed both the trial court's and appellate division's deci-
*33sions.
In making its determination, the New York Court of Appeals
relied on Crawford v. Washington34 and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
setts. In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court made a pivotal
distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements under
the Confrontation Clause.36 Defendant Crawford had stabbed a man
by the name of Kenneth Lee, who allegedly attempted to rape his
wife.3 ' At trial, the prosecution tried to introduce the recording of the
wife's account 38 of the incident to the police "as evidence that the
29 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930.
30 Id
31 Id. The appellate division concluded that the "introduction of the DNA report did not
violate defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right." Id. The appellate division heard
Defendant Brown's case before Melendez-Diaz was decided by the Supreme Court. Id at
930 n.3.
32 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 928, 932.
3 Id. at 930.
34 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
" 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
1 Id. at 38.
38 In the State of Washington, the marital privilege "does not extend to a spouse's out-of-
court statements admissible under a hearsay exception." Id. at 40.
[Vol. 261018
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stabbing was not in self-defense."3 9 The trial court admitted the re-
cording, deeming it sufficiently trustworthy, and the Washington Su-
preme Court agreed.40 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the introduction of the recording violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.4 1
The Court maintained that when non-testimonial statements
are at issue, the states are given flexibility to develop their hearsay
laws as they chose.4 2 However, when testimonial statements are at
issue, the Sixth Amendment demands that such evidence be admissi-
ble "only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the de-
fendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." 43 In its deci-
sion, the Court noted that the term " 'testimonial' . . . . at a minimum
[encompasses] prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations," 44 but
failed to indicate whether laboratory reports constituted "testimonial"
evidence.45
Five years later, the Supreme Court bridged the gap by ans-
wering that question in Melendez-Diaz.4 6 Defendant "Melendez-Diaz
was charged with distributing and . .. trafficking . . . cocaine." 4 7 At
trial, the prosecution sought to introduce "three 'certificates of analy-
sis' showing the results of the forensic analysis performed" on the
bags containing the cocaine-like substance, which were seized when
the defendant was arrested.48 The certificates indicated the weight of
the bags and the analyst's conclusion that the substance was in fact
cocaine. 49 The trial court admitted the certificates, pursuant to state
law, reasoning that they were " 'prima facie evidence of the composi-
tion, quality, and the net weight of the narcotic . . . analyzed.' "5o The
39 id.
40 Id. at 40, 41.
41 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
42 id.
43 Id at 59.
4 Id at 68.
45 In fact, Justice Scalia acknowledged in his opinion that it was to be left "for another day
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' " Id. at 68.
46 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527.
47 Id. at 2530.
48 Id. at 2531.
49 id.
50 Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 13 (2010)).
2010] 1019
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defendant appealed his conviction, but the Appeals Court of Massa-
chusetts agreed with the lower court's admission of the certificates.s'
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, reasoning
that the admission of the certificates, without witness testimony of
the analyst, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to con-
frontation.52
Although Crawford had not explicitly included the documents
at issue as part of the " 'core class of testimonial statements,' " the
Court in Melendez-Diaz had "little doubt" that laboratory reports
would fall within such category. 53 The Court stated that "[t]he 'cer-
tificates' [were] functionally identical to live, in-court testimony,
doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' 4 Fur-
thermore, the certificates were " 'made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use at a later trial.' " Thus, the Court
held that laboratory reports are considered "testimonial statements,"
and as such, "[a]bsent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to
testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine them, petitioner was entitled to 'be confronted with' the ana-
lysts at trial."56
After its analysis of the federal law, the Court of Appeals of
New York in Brown then turned to People v. Meekins and its compa-
nion case, People v. Rawlins.57 In Meekins, the defendant was con-
5 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
52 Id. at 2542 (reasoning that affidavits were mentioned twice by Crawford as being testi-
monial and "law 'certificates' are quite plainly affidavits: 'declaration[s] of facts written
down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths' " (quot-
ing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004))).
" Id. at 2532. Melendez-Diaz was recently challenged in Briscoe v. Virginia. See Bris-
coe, No. 07-11191, 2010 WL 246152 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2010). Pursuant to statute, defendant
waived his right to cross-examination of a laboratory expert during the prosecution's case-in-
chief due to his failure to notify the State of his desire to conduct such cross examination.
Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 115 (V.A. 2008). The Supreme Court re-
manded the case, which directions to render a decision not inconsistent with Melendez-Diaz.
Briscoe, 2010 WL 246152, at *1.
54 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830
(2006)).
s5 Id (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). The Court explained that the analysts must
have been aware that the certificates would be used at a later trial since their evidentiary pur-
pose was clearly printed on the certificates themselves. Id
56 Id at 2532 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54).
s7 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). It is important to note that both of these cases were de-
1020 [Vol. 26
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victed of first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and third-
degree robbery. At trial, the prosecution introduced a DNA report,
prepared by a private laboratory from the alleged victim's rape kit.59
In that case, two experts testified, neither of whom performed the ac-
tual analysis. 60 Each testified to the general procedures used to test
the DNA sample and their opinions based on the results. 61 The New
York Court of Appeals held that the report was not "testimonial"
since "[t]he graphical DNA test results, standing alone, shed no light
on the guilt of the accused in the absence of an expert's opinion that
the results genetically match[ed] a known sample," and the experts
that testified played such role.62
In Rawlins, however, a fingerprint comparison report pre-
pared by police was considered "testimonial."63 In that case, finger-
prints were lifted from the scene of six burglarized Manhattan com-
mercial establishments and reports comparing those fingerprints with
those of the defendant were introduced at trial.M The reports were
prepared by two officers, but only one testified at trial. 65 The defen-
dant was convicted of six counts of third-degree burglary, and the ap-
pellate division affirmed the conviction. 66 The New York Court of
Appeals held that the fingerprint reports "were clearly testimonial be-
cause . . . [the officers] prepared [the] reports for prosecutorial pur-
poses and, most importantly, because they were accusatory and of-
fered to establish [the] defendant's identity." 67
Since then, New York has provided further clarification as to
what constitutes a "testimonial statement" under Crawford. The
court in Brown relied upon People v. Freycinet, in which the defen-
dant was "indicted for murder, manslaughter, and other crimes"
cided before Melendez-Diaz.
" Id. at 1024.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1024-25.
62 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1035.
63 Id. at 1033.
6 Id. at 1022-23.
61 Id. at 1023.
66 Id. at 1022, 1024.
67 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. However, the Court concluded that the admission of the
reports, without testimony from one of the officers, "was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt," and thus affirmed the appellate division's decision. Id.
2010] 1021
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against his girlfriend.68 At trial, a report regarding the autopsy con-
ducted on the victim was introduced, with the "opinions as to the
cause and manner of the victim's death" removed from it. 69 A differ-
ent doctor from the same office testified as an expert a trial, "giving
opinions based on the facts in . .. [the] report," and made the conclu-
sion that the victim died of bleeding from the wound where she was
stabbed and that the stabber was likely right-handed.7 0 The defendant
was convicted of manslaughter in the second-degree. 7' The appellate
division affirmed, and on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed as well.72
At the time of this decision, Melendez-Diaz had not yet been
decided by the United States Supreme Court, thus the New York
Court of Appeals sought to shed some light on the definition of "tes-
timonial statements" in the context of laboratory reports. The court
set forth some factors to determine the
"indicia of testimonially" [which include] . . . . [(1)]
the extent to which the entity conducting the proce-
dure is "an 'arm' of law enforcement". . . [(2)] wheth-
er the contents of the report are contemporaneous
record of objective facts, or reflect the exercise of "fal-
lible human judgment" . . . [(3)] whether a pro-law-
enforcement bias is likely to influence the contents of
the report .. . and [(4)] whether the report's contents
are "directly accusatory" in the sense that they expli-
citly link the defendant to the crime.74
The current state of the federal law with respect to the Con-
frontation Clause is similar to that of New York. The United States
Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness
6 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843, 844 (N.Y. 2008).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 845.
1 Id.
72 Id.
n See Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 845 ("The Supreme Court has not defined 'testimony' in
this context.").
74 Id. at 845-46 (internal citations omitted).
[Vol. 261022
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against him."7 5 As established in Crawford, when non-testimonial
statements are at issue, the states are given flexibility to establish
their hearsay laws as they chose.76 However, when testimonial
statements are at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands that such evi-
dence be admissible "only where the declarant is unavailable, and on-
ly where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine."7 7 Testimonial statements include "ex parte in-court testi-
mony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable
to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." 78 Additionally, labora-
tory reports fall under the category of "testimonial statements" be-
cause they are " 'made under circumstances which would lead an ob-jective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.' "79
The New York Constitution, states, in pertinent part, that "[i]n
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed
to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him or her."so In ad-
dition to the Crawford and Melendez-Diaz decisions, New York has
further refined the law with respect to the Confrontation Clause with
the addition of Brown. Under Brown, only one analyst must be called
by the prosecution in order to satisfy the Constitution.81 As long as
the analyst who "conducted the actual analysis at issue" testifies at
trial, the obligations of the Confrontation Clause will be met.82
Although New York jurisprudence has provided greater clari-
ty as to how the Confrontation Clause must be satisfied, it is also very
biased. By requiring the prosecution to call only one analyst to the
stand, New York has set out a standard that greatly favors the prose-
cution. The New York Court of Appeals has made the burden on the
prosecution to satisfy the Confrontation Clause much easier than the
federal standard by requiring only the "analysis making" analyst be
7 U.S. CONST. amend VI.
76 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
n Id. at 59.
* Id. at 51.
79 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
so N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
81 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932.
82 Id. at 931.
2010] 1023
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called to the stand, rather than multiple analysts in the chain of custo-
dy of the report.
Granted, Melendez-Diaz does not require the burdensome task
of calling every analyst in the chain of custody to testify about a par-
ticular report.83 As stated by the Supreme Court, "it is not the case
... that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the
chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the test-
ing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case."84
Nor does Melendez-Diaz give any greater clarification than New
York.
The New York Court of Appeals does not give any rationale
as to why the analyst who draws inferences about the report is best
suited to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. This easier burden for the
prosecution unfairly disadvantages the defendant. Incorrectly analyz-
ing, mishandling and contamination of evidence are common prob-
lems in the criminal justice field.
For instance, a problem that dates back to 1978 is the "wide
range of proficiency levels among the nation's laboratories."8 In a
report sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
("LEAA report"), two hundred crime laboratories were examined re-
garding various analyses they conduct on a regular basis. 86 Unac-
ceptable proficiency was found most often attributed to: "a)
[m]isinterpretation of the test results by the examiner resulting from
carelessness or lack of experience; b) [f]ailure to employ adequate
methodology, or failure to employ appropriate methodology; c)
[m]islabelled or contaminated primary standards; [and] d)
[i]nadequate data bases or standard spectra."87
Although greater regulations have been passed since the
88LEAA report, problems remain amongst laboratories nationwide.
83 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
84 Id. at 2532 n.1.
8 JOSEPH L. PETERSON, ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH
PROGRAM 3 (1978).
86 Id. at 1-2. The samples that were distributed included "controlled substances, blood,
plaint, glass, hair, fibers, firearms, physiological fluids (semen, saliva), questioned docu-
ments, wood, arson accelerants, soils and metals." Id.
87 Id. at 258 (emphasis removed from original).
88 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C.A. § 14131(a), (c) (2000) (establishing a federal proficiency testing
program for DNA analysis); N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 995-b (McKinney 2009) (requiring "accredi-
tation for all forensic laboratories in New York state").
1024 [Vol. 26
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In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences authored a report on fo-
rensic science entitled Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward ("NAS Report"). 89 The NAS Report detailed
the strengths and weaknesses of forensic science and how to improve
upon such weaknesses. 90 It attributed many of the problems that exist
among forensic laboratories to being "underresourced and unders-
taffed."91 Forensic analysts are limited in their ability to produce the
most accurate results because of debilitating backlogs, inadequate re-
search funding, and large disparities in formal training and education
of forensic scientists. 92 Acknowledging the importance of accurate
and uniform proficiency in forensic analysis for the purpose of jus-
tice, the NAS Report warns that "the fragmented nature of the foren-
sic science community raises worrisome prospect that the quality of
evidence presented in court, and its interpretation, can vary unpre-
dictably according to jurisdiction." 93
Justice Scalia, in the. majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz, ela-
borated on the existing problems amongst forensic laboratories and
inconsistencies in test results. He noted that "[a] forensic analyst res-
ponding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pres-
sure-or have incentive-to alter the evidence in a manner favorable
to the prosecution." 94
These problems will only compound at trial when certain ana-
89 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADs., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
90 See id.
91 Id. at 77 ("Existing data suggest that forensic laboratories are under resourced and un-
derstaffed, which contributes to a backlog in cases and likely makes it difficult for laborato-
ries to do as much as they could to inform investigations, provide strong evidence for prose-
cutions, and avoid errors that could lead to imperfect justice.").
92 Id. at 77-78. The report particularly emphasizes that
[t]he forensic science community ... is hindered by its extreme disag-
gregation-marked by multiple types of practitioners with different le-
vels of education and training and different professional cultures and
standards for performance. Many forensic scientists are given scant op-
portunity for professional activities such as attending conferences or
publishing their research, which could help strengthen the professional
community.
Id. at 78.
9 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 89, at 78.
94 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. Justice Scalia also extensively discussed the NAS
Report in his opinion. See id. at 2536-38.
2010] 1025
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lysts will not be required to account for their part in analyzing an evi-
dentiary sample. According to the Brown decision, it is constitutional
that only the "conclusion making" analyst testify about the report and
the analysts who handled and conducted examinations of the sub-
stances would be passed over for testimony. How is that fair to the
defendant? An analyst who removes a powdery white substance
from a bag and fails to properly clean the tools that were previously
used to test cocaine is not required to testify under this theory. If two
laboratory technicians conduct two separate analyses of two separate
substances in the same room at the same time, both analysts are not
required to testify that they kept their workspaces independent of the
other's and free from contamination. In a chain of analysts who han-
dle evidence, "[e]ach one has contributed to the test's result and has,
at least in some respects, made a representation about the test. . . .
[but] each [one also] has the power to introduce error." 95
Furthermore, Brown may raise potential hearsay issues.
When the analyst who makes the conclusions regarding the laborato-
ry report testifies in court, does this mean that she is allowed to testi-
fy to out-of-court statements made by other analysts? Does this not
fall under the definition of hearsay? 96 Additionally, if a junior la-
boratory technician makes a statement to his or her superior who
compiles the final report, is that statement testimonial as well? By
allowing one laboratory technician to testify for the entire testing de-
partment, that technician may be in a situation in which he or she is
testifying to multiple out-of-court statements, made by many differ-
ent laboratory technicians, which may be protected by the Confronta-
tion Clause.
Arguably, Brown adequately addresses many social and eco-
nomic costs that Melendez-Diaz left open. If courts required all ana-
9 Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy similarly stated that
[a] laboratory technician might adulterate the sample. The independent
contractor might botch the machine's calibration. And so forth. The
reasons for these errors may range from animus against the particular
suspect or all criminal suspects to unintentional oversight; from gross
negligence to good-faith mistake.
Id. at 2545.
96 " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
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lysts that ever touched laboratory analyzed evidence to testify, it
would impose a tremendous fiscal burden on the criminal justice sys-
tem. Trials are already very costly on the individual and society, with
fees associated with attorneys, government employees, witnesses, ju-
rors, laboratories, etc. To require the prosecution to call every ana-
lyst that ever handled a piece of evidence, whether he or she played a
minor or major role in the analysis, could result in astronomical fees
incurred by the State. As a result of our extremely litigious society,
the judicial process already carries a heavy burden. Calling even
more witnesses at trial could impose weeks, possibly months, worth
of delays. The burden of trying to accommodate attorneys', judges',
clients', clerks', witnesses', and stenographers' schedules is already
difficult. Imagine trying to incorporate five more witnesses' sche-
dules into a trial. The amount of time and money that may result
could be astronomical and possibly harmful to the judicial system.
Fittingly, Brown seeks to answer the precise problem that the
dissent in Melendez-Diaz foreshadowed. In Melendez-Diaz, Justice
Kennedy addressed the potential money and time issues that could
arise from the majority's decision when he gave the following exam-
ple:
Consider how many people play a role in a routine test
for the presence of illegal drugs. One person prepares
a sample of the drug, places it in a testing machine,
and retrieves the machine's printout-often a graph
showing the frequencies of radiation absorbed by the
sample or the masses of the sample's molecular frag-
ments. . . . 'A second person interprets the graph the
machine prints out-perhaps by comparing that prin-
tout with published, standardized graphs of known
drugs.... Meanwhile, a third person-perhaps an in-
dependent contractor-has calibrated the machine and,
having done so, has certified that the machine is in
good working order. Finally, a fourth person-
perhaps the laboratory's director--certifies that his
subordinates followed established procedures.97
97 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly states that "evidence may
be excluded . . . by considerations of undue delay [and] waste of
time."98 Arguably, if the prosecution is required to call every analyst
that has handled or tested a single piece of evidence, it would directly
contradict one of the reasons for which relevant evidence may be ex-
cluded, as set forth by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Ultimately, the decision comes down to a cost-benefit analy-
sis of how much time and money we are willing to spend versus how
thorough we must be to ensure the defendant has sufficiently had the
opportunity to confront the witness(es) against him or her. Neverthe-
less, New York has chosen the former by requiring the prosecution to
call only one analyst, so long as it is the analyst who makes the actual
inferences in a laboratory report.99 While some may champion this
decision as a fair and cost-effective way to administer a criminal de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right, in reality, this may be a quite cost-
ly decision. By conducting less thorough cross-examinations, more
wrongful convictions may result. Moreover, the cost to imprison
those wrongly convicted will be great and will fall squarely on the
- shoulders of the taxpayers of the State of New York. The New York
Court of Appeals decision in Brown was logical, however, in the end
it will prove to be a tremendous disservice to the criminal justice sys-
tem and the "fair" trial we seek to provide the accused.
Madeline Zuckerman
98 FED. R. EVID. R. 403.
99 Brown, at 918 N.E.2d at 932.
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